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I. INTRODUCTION

On May 21, 2018, in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, the Supreme
Court rejected the argument that the protection for concerted activity
in the National Labor Relations Act bars employers from requiring
employees to waive their right to class and collective actions as a
condition of employment. 1 While the decision is wrong for many
reasons,2 employee advocates must move forward to explore other
* Professor of Law Emerita, University of Richmond. Thanks to Mollie Laird, University
of Richmond, Class of 2019 and Caitlin Yuhas, Class of 2020 for research assistance and to
Michael Oswalt, Associate Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law for
valuable comments.
1. 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). For two years I had the pleasure of working with Doug Scherer
on the Supreme Court review for the Employee Rights and Employment Policy Journal.
Accordingly, it is fitting to address another Supreme Court case in this tribute issue to Professor
Scherer and his invaluable work on the journal since its inception.
2. See Brief Amici Curiae of Law Professors in Support of Petitioners in 16-285 & 16-300
and in Support of Respondents In 16-307, Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (Nos. 16-285,
16-300, 16-307) (arguing that Norris-LaGuardia prohibits conditioning employment on waivers
of section 7 rights); Ann C. Hodges, Can Compulsory Arbitration Be Reconciled With Section 7
Rights?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173 (2003) (arguing that section 7 bars mandatory
arbitration); see also Deepak Gupta, Symposium: For Decades, Court Has Built "an Edifice of
Its Own Creation" in Arbitration Cases -

It's Time to Tear It Down and Rebuild,

SCOTUSBLOG (May 24, 2018, 4:13 PM), <http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/05/symposium-fordecades-co urt -h as-bui It -an-edi fice-o f-i ts-own -crea ti on-i n-ar bi tr ati on-cases-its-time-to-tear-it-do
wn-and-rebuildl>; Moshe Marvit & Leo Gertner, Supreme Court Decision Greatly Reduces
Worker Protections, CENTURY FOUND. (May 30, 2018), <https://tcf.org/content/commentary/
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avenues to address the problems created by employer-imposed
arbitration. There are many issues with individual arbitration
compelled by employers, which is often imposed on unwitting
employees, making it difficult if not impossible to vindicate their
statutory rights. Yet arbitration is not all bad. Labor unions and
employers have successfully used arbitration for many years to
resolve contract disputes.
Employee advocates and unions have some options in the
aftermath of the Epic Systems decision to encourage a fairer
arbitration system. One solution is for labor unions to provide
representation for individual employees in their arbitration cases. 3 As
I have argued elsewhere, compulsory arbitration provides an
opportunity for unions to demonstrate their value to beleaguered
workers. 4 Another possibility is congressional action. Advocates are
already pushing in Congress for legal limits on arbitration. 5 An
alternative to restricting or banning arbitration for particular disputes
is to require employers who want to institute arbitration for their
employees to negotiate an agreement regarding the terms of the
arbitration with a representative chosen by their employees. Such a
requirement would provide employees with both input into and
knowledge about any required arbitration agreement. Employers
would be free to use arbitration if they deem it beneficial, but only
after engaging in good faith negotiations about the terms. If
arbitration is indeed of value to both employers and employees, the
parties should be able to reach agreement on acceptable terms.
Employers using arbitration only to diminish employee rights may
abandon it if required to negotiate its terms. While the requirement
would not solve all the problems with arbitration, it would at least
offer employees a voice in this vital term of their employment.
In addition, a negotiation requirement would flip some of the
suprcmc-court-dccision-grcatly-reduccs-workcr-protcctions/?agrccd=1 > (criticizing the Court's
decision on several grounds); Katherine Stone, Symposium: Majority Gives Short Shrift to
Worker Rights, SCOTUSBL0G (May 23, 2018, 2:43 PM); <http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/05/
symposium-majori ty-gi vcs-short-shrift-to-workcr-rights/> (same).
3. See Ann C. Hodges, Trilogy Redux: Using Arbitration to Rebuild the Labor Movement,
98 MINN. L. REV. 1682, 1683 (2014); see also Michael Z. Green, Finding Lawyers for Employees
in Discrimination Disputes as a Critical Prescription for Unions to Embrace Racial Justice, 7 U.
PA.1. LAB. & EMP. L. 55, 108-10 (2004) (encouraging unions to bring race discrimination claims
for non-union employees in litigation or arbitration).
4. Hodges, supra note 3, at 1703.
5. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 1374, 115th Cong. (2017); Arbitration Fairness
Act of 2018, S. 2591, 115th Cong. (2018); Restoring Justice for Workers Act, H.R. 7109, 115th
'Cong. (2018).
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incentives in the administrative process in an interesting way.
Currently, in the union representation process before the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB), employers have every incentive to
delay to discourage employees from choosing a union to represent
them. Further, once a representative is chosen, they have every
incentive to delay negotiations to avoid a collective bargaining
agreement which binds them to negotiated terms and conditions of
employment. If they were barred from arbitrating employee claims
until they negotiated an agreement with their employees' chosen
representative, the incentives would be reversed, protecting the
interests of the employees rather than allowing the more powerful
employer to use the bureaucratic process to its advantage.
This article proceeds as follows. First, it briefly surveys the
documented concerns about employer-imposed arbitration. Then it
assesses how a negotiation requirement might address some of those
concerns and highlights other possible benefits of the proposal. The
article then sketches out the rough contours of a negotiation
requirement, considering some of the challenges to implementation.
Finally the article assesses the likelihood of enactment. While a
negotiation mandate would not solve all the problems of compulsory
arbitration agreements, it would provide employees with a voice in
their employment terms and perhaps encourage employee
involvement in other aspects of employment. In addition, it may
discourage some employers from using arbitration if their only
purpose is to restrict employee rights.
IL THE PROBLEMS WITH EMPLOYER-IMPOSED ARBITRATION

Employers are increasingly adopting arbitration as the exclusive
method of resolving disputes with their employees. 6 Predictions are
that more employers will require arbitration after the Supreme
7
Court's decision in Epic Systems, in order to preclude class actions.
Examining the advantages for employers reveals the concerns of
compulsory arbitration's critics.
Initially, as noted in Justice Ginsburg's dissent, many cases that

6. Alexander J.S. Colvin & Kelly Pike, Saturns & Rickshaws Revisited: What Kind of
Arbitration System Has Developed, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 59, 81-82 (2014); Katherine
V.W. Stone & Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Arbitration Epidemic 3 (Econ. Pol'y Inst. Briefing
Paper No. 414, 2015), <hllps://www.epi.org/files/2015/arbitration-cpidemie.pdf>.
7. See Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1644-47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Marvit & Gertner,
supra note 2; see also Stone, supra note 2.
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cannot be brought as class actions will not be brought at all. 8 For low
value claims, the expenses of individual arbitration will often
outweigh the potential recovery. 9 Fear of retaliation may also deter
individual claims. 10 Thus, the employer escapes claims and, where
there is a violation of the law, liability.
It is not only the unavailability of class actions that deters claims.
Arbitration can be more expensive than litigation and often includes
discouraging upfront costs. 11 Additionally, employees win fewer
arbitrations and when they do win, they recover less than they would
12
in court. These factors, along with other limitations common to
arbitration such as reduced discovery and limited damages, dissuade
attorneys from representing workers in arbitration. 13 And employees
who are unrepresented are less likely to prevail in arbitration. 14 Thus
a vicious cycle is created. The factors that make it more difficult to
prevail in arbitration discourage attorneys from representing workers,
and the lack of representation makes it even less likely that
employees will prevail. 15
In addition, arbitration avoids a jury trial which is available for
many employment claims. 16 Juries are traditionally perceived as more
sympathetic to employees than to employers. 17 The absence of a jury
trial is another factor that reduces the ability of employees to find
8. Epic Sys._Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1646 ("The inevitable result of today's decision will be
the underenforcement of federal and state statutes designed to advance the well-being of
vulnerable workers.").
9. Id. The Supreme Court has dismissed this concern in enforcing arbitration agreements
that preclude class claims. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013).
10. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1647.
11. Colvin & Pike, supra note 6, at 81-82 (stating that based on the empirical research
often "bringing cases in employment arbitration will not be economically viable and the system
will not be readily accessible to employees").
12. Id. at 79; see also ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN & MARK D. GOUGH, COMPARING
MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND LITIGATION: ACCESS, PROCESS, AND OUTCOMES 21-22
(2014 ), available at <h ttps://digitaleommons.ilr .come! l.edu/cgi/viewcontcnt.cgi ?rcferer=https//
www .google.com/&httpsredir= 1&article=1059&con text=reports>.
13. Jean Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers Are Using
Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 133440 (2015). As Sternlight notes, empirical research comparing arbitration and litigation is
challenging, but what is important is that the belief that employees will fare poorly in arbitration
discourages claims. Id. at 1322-23. And attorneys clearly have a negative view of mandatory
arbitration. COLVIN & GOUGH, supra note 12, at 12-20.
14. Colvin & Pike, supra note 6, at 80.
15. Id. at 78 (showing attorney representation is a significant predictor of employee win
rates and higher damage recoveries in arbitration).
16. Jean R. Stemlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for
the Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 34-35 (2003).
17. RICHARD BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION 148 (1997); see also Colvin & Pike,
supra note 6, at 77.
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• 18
1ega1 representat10n.
Other factors may affect employee win rates and damage
recoveries. Arbitration plans promulgated by employers may include
shortened statutes of limitations that preclude employee claims. 19 The
employer may have substantial control or even exclusive choice of the
arbitrator. 20 This raises the possibility that the employer may choose
either an unqualified arbitrator 21 or one more likely to rule in its
favor. Also, limits on discovery may make it difficult to prove
employee claims where much of the evidence is in the control of the
employer. 22 And limits on damages may prevent an employee from
obtaining relief that would have been available in court. 23 Some
arbitration systems even allow the employer to change the rules or
the arbitrator mid-stream. 24
Another employer advantage in arbitration is the repeat player
phenomenon. In employment arbitration, unlike labor arbitration, the
employer is a repeat player but the employee is not. Research
indicates that repeat players fare better in arbitration. Employers who
have arbitrated previously prevail more often and when they have
arbitrated other cases before the same arbitrator, they are even more
likely to win. 25 Additionally, when the employer is a repeat player,
employee recoveries diminish even further. 26
The way employers obtain agreements to arbitrate poses another
problem. Employers use a variety of methods to get agreement from
18. Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over PreDispute
Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON OISP. RESOL. 559, 563-66 (2001).
19. Martin H. Malin, Due Process in Employment Arbitration: The State of the Law and the
Need for Self-Regulation, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 363, 395 (2007); see also Stone &
Colvin, supra note 6, at 4.
20. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938-39 ( 4th Cir. 1999); see also Stone &
Colvin, supra note 6, at 17.
21. See Harry T. Edwards, Where Are We Heading with Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory
Claims in Employment?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 293, 298, 309 (1999). This concern about
arbitrator 4uality has abated in the courts but not among arbitration's critics.
22. Malin, supra note 19, at 397-98.
23. Stone & Colvin, supra note 6, at 4.
24. Hooters of Am., Inc., 173 F.3d at 939.
25. Douglas M. Mahony & Hoyt N. Wheeler, Adjudication of Workplace Disputes, in
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW AND ECONOMICS 361, 389-90 (Kenneth G. Dau Schmidt et al.
eds., 2009); Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in
Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 234, 238
(1998); Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes
and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 1, 9 (2011). But see Estreicher, supra note 18, at 566
(citing later research by Bingham finding a substantially reduced benefit from being a repeal
player).
26. Bingham, supra note 25, at 234.
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their employees, some employed to obscure their intent. 27 The
agreement might be emailed to employees, contained in an employee
handbook, placed on the employment application, or provided to the
employee in hard copy. 28 The employee might be asked to sign an
acknowledgement of receipt and/or an agreement to arbitrate, or
29
might be told that continued employment constitutes acceptance.
The details of the agreement may or may not be provided to the
employee at the time of signing. 30 Typically the agreement is a
condition of employment, but some employers allow employees to
opt out. 31 Many employees do not opt out, however, whether that is
due to fear of retaliation or rescission of a job offer, lack of
knowledge of the agreement or its consequences, lack of concern, or
some other reason. 32
27. See Skirchak v. Dynamics Research Corp., 508 F.3d 49, 60 (2d Cir. 2007) (refusing to
enforce waiver of class action in arbitration program where "[t]hc timing, the language, and the
format of the presentation of the Program obscured, whether intentionally or not, the waiver of
class rights"); Maye v. Smith Barney, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 100, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (describing
process by which employees had to sign seventy-five documents, including the arbitration
agreement, in a two-hour period without any explanation, without adequate opportunity to read
the documents, and in a pressured atmosphere).
28. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1636 n.2 (2018) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (describing how employers in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis and Ernst & Young v.
Morris emailed arbitration agreements to their employees); Lorenzo v. Prime Commc'ns L.P.,
806 F.3d 777, 781-82 (4th Cir. 2015) (involving arbitration provision contained in employee
handbook); Soto v. State Indus. Prods., Inc., 642 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2011) (enforcing agreement
where employee was provided and signed a copy although she claimed she did not understand it
because it was in English); Seawright v. Am. Gen. Fin. Scrvs., Inc., 507 F.3d 967, 971-73 (6th Cir.
2007) (enforcing agreement where letter sent to employees indicating that continued
employment would constitute acceptance of agreement to arbitrate); Walker v. Ryan's Family
Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2005) (refusing to enforce agreement contained in
employment application for lack of consideration).
29. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp.,138 S. Ct. at 1636 n.2 (describing how employers in Epic
Systems v. Lewis and Ernst & Young v. Morris emailed arbitration agreements to their
employees telling them continued employment constituted acceptance of the agreement);
Lorenzo, 806 F.3d at 781-82 (refusing to enforce arbitration provision contained in employee
handbook where employee signed acknowledgement form for receipt of handbook that
disclaimed any intent to create a contract).
30. See Hcrgcnrcder v. Bickford Senior Living Grp. LLC, 656 F.3d 411,418 (6th Cir. 2011)
(finding no agreement to arbitrate where employee signed acknowledgement of receipt of
handbook which referred to separate dispute resolution procedure but did not require her to
review it or indicate that she was assenting to it).
31. The opt-out process often involves the timely filing of a designated form. See, e.g.,
Branco v. S. Operations LLC, No. 17-23289-CIV, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121784, at *5-6 (S.D.
Fla. July 19, 2018); Sellers v. Macy's Retail Holdings, Inc., No. 12-cv-02496-SHL-tmp, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 85879, at *4-6 (W.D. Tenn. June 5, 2014); Wright v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 82 F.
Supp. 2d 1279, 1280-81 (N.D. Ala. 2000).
32. See Branco, No. 17-23289-CIV, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121784, at *4-5, *9-13 (noting
employee fear and confusion over arbitration agreement and failure to opt out). Another court
referenced a general reluctance of employees to opt out, even if given the choice. See Tigges v.
AM Pizza, Inc., No. 16-10136-WGY, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100366, at *38-39 n.19 (D. Mass.
July 29, 2016) (citing Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 SCI.
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Proponents of arbitration have argued that a speedy forum33 that
doesn't require hiring an attorney offers an opportunity for workers
who cannot obtain representation or afford a lengthy legal battle. 34
While this argument has superficial appeal, the data do not show
widespread use of arbitration by employees generally,35 or by low
wage employees in particular. 36
Among other criticisms of arbitration are concerns that it will
limit public exposure of legal violations, decreasing the deterrent
effect of the laws and allowing patterns of violations of employee
rights to continue. 37 A related worry is that development of the law
may be suppressed, with fewer judicial opinions interpreting
statutes. 38
Ill. THE BENEFITS OF A NEGOTIATION REQUIREMENT

While the foregoing details a variety of problems for employees
compelled to arbitrate rather than litigate claims, not all arbitration is
the same. Some arbitration providers limit the amount that
employees can be charged and require the agreement to contain
provisions designed to ensure fairness. 39 Providers may refuse to
administer arbitration that does not comply with these provisions. 40
1338 (2003)); see also Byron R. Goldstein & William C. Jhavcri-Wccks, The Opt-Out Trap,
PLAINTIFF MAG., Nov. 2016, at 24.
33. Colvin & Pike, supra note 6, at 73 (finding arbitration cases took about one year to
hearing while court cases average two years). Although arbitration is quicker than litigation, it is
still time consuming.
34. Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Changing Role of Labor Arbitration, 76 IND. L.J. 83, 91
(2001).
35. Sternlight, supra note 13, at 1329.
36. See Mahony & Wheeler, supra note 25, at 385, 390; Colvin & Pike, supra note 6, at 80;
Mark Gough, The High Cost of an Inexpensive Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Employment
Discrimination Claims Heard in Arbitration and Civil Litigation, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 91, 110 (2014 ).
37. See, e.g., Katherine Van Wczel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual
Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 1017, 1042-43,
1047 (1996).
38. Id. at 1047.
39. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Private Regulation of Consumer
Arbitration, 79 TENN. L. REV. 289, 294-95, 302-03, 305-06 (2012) (describing protocols of major
arbitration providers and finding that the American Arbitration Association enforced the
protocol for consumer disputes); Sternlight, supra note 13, at 1309 n.3; see also AM.
ARBITRATION ASS'N, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES
(2017) <http://go.adr.org/rs/294-SFS-516/imagcs/EmploymentRules_Web.pdf>; Employment/
Workplace Fee Schedule Costs of Arbitration, AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N (Oct. 1, 2017),
<http://info.adr.org/cmploymcntfcesehedulel> (limiting employee's fee to $ 300 unless the
agreement provides that the employee pays less).
40. Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 39, at 303.
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Also, the most egregiously unfair provisions will not be enforced by
the courts,41 allowing the employee to litigate the claims instead.
Litigating the enforceability of the arbitration agreement, however,
adds to the cost of litigation and may deter both employees and
attorneys from bringing claims.
In contrast to employment arbitration, labor arbitration has
received relatively little criticism. 42 The difference is that labor
arbitration provisions are negotiated by unions representing the
interests of workers, who then represent those workers in the
arbitration itself. 43 Further the union operates as a repeat player in the
arbitration system, eliminating the one-sided repeat player problem. 44
Arbitrators are-jointly selected by the parties and in order to insure
continuing work must not be perceived to favor either labor or
management. 45
Some commentators have suggested that employee attorneys
could serve the repeat player function. 46 But the evidence shows that
employees often arbitrate without representation and even when they
do hire attorneys, they are often not specialists in employment law, 47
significantly reducing the likelihood that the attorneys will share
information about arbitrators in ways that make them effective repeat
players.
Another way to make employment arbitration more like labor
arbitration would be to require that employers who want to use
arbitration reach agreement with their employees first. The Fair
Labor Standards Act contains a provision requiring agreement with
employees if a public employer wants to substitute compensatory
time for overtime pay. 48 A similar mandate has the potential to
respond to some of the criticisms of employment arbitration.
41. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933,940 (4th Cir. 1999); Drahozal, supra note
39, at 298-99; see also Stone & Colvin, supra note 6, at 9.
42. Some commentators, however, have argued that labor arbitration has been detrimental
to employee rights by focusing on contractual enforcement of rights by experts rather than
encouraging employee activism. See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial
Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective
Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 629-31 (1992).
43. Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, l EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL'Y J.189, 196-97 (1997).
44. Stone & Colvin, supra note 6, at 22; see also Bingham, supra note 25, at 234, 238.
45. LAURA J. COOPER ET AL., ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 22-24, 31 (3d ed. 2014).
46. See Bingham, supra note 43, at 197-98.
47. Colvin & Pike, supra note 6, at 69-70.
48. 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(2)(A) (2012) (allowing compensatory time in lieu of overtime pay
for public employees if negotiated with the representative of the employees or by agreement or
understanding with individual employees before the overtime work).
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The FLSA allows employers to bypass employee representatives
and to present agreements to the individual employee as a condition
of employment, however. 49 This concession makes the FLSA rights
far less valuable to employees, who are less likely to enforce their
rights in the absence of collective representation. 50 To achieve the
purpose of making employment arbitration more like labor
arbitration, the mandate envisioned here would require the employer
to negotiate with a representative of all of the employees covered by
the agreement. Representatives for negotiation could be an employee
or group of employees, a labor union, an attorney, a nonprofit
organization, or any other option freely chosen by the employees. 51
In addition to the FLSA's negotiation requirement, examples
from other countries offer models facilitating employee voice distinct
from traditional labor unions and collective bargaining. 52 For example
in Germany, works councils can be created by employees in facilities
with or without unions to deal with the employer on issues such as
work rules, work schedules, and safety. 53 Unions may play a role in
works councils in unionized facilities, but the works council is a
separate organization to provide employee voice. 54 Similarly, the
49. See, e.g., Moreau v. Klcvenhagcn, 508 U.S. 22, 34 (1993) (interpreting the law to allow
individual bargaining although the employees had chosen a representative, because Texas did
not authorize collective bargaining for public employees); 29 C.F.R. § 553.23 (2018) (stating that
where there is no representative "the agreement or understanding to provide compensatory
time off ... may take the form of an express condition of employment, provided (i) the
employee knowingly and voluntarily agrees to it as a condition of employment and (ii) the
employee is informed that the compensatory time received may be preserved, used or cashed
out consistent with the provisions of [the law]"); Baker v. Stone Cty., Mo., 41 F. Supp. 2d 965,
994-95 (W.D. Mo. 1999) (finding agreement where employees were informed of the policy of
paying for compensatory time and either did not expressly object or if they did object, did not
either refuse employment or refuse to accept compensatory time).
50. See David J. Walsh, The FLSA Comp Time Controversy: Fostering Flexibility or
Diminishing Worker Rights?, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 74, 124 (1999).
51. Employees might also choose an organization like a worker center, but such
organizations may be reluctant to deal with employers out of concern for being deemed a labor
organization for purposes of labor laws, which imposes a variety of requirements and
limitations. David Rosenfeld, Worker Centers: Emerging Labor Organizations - Until They
Confront the National Labor Relations Act, 27 BERKELEY J. LAB. & EMP. L. 469, 482-86, 499-504
(2006). Implementing legislation should provide that representation for the limited purpose of
negotiating an arbitration provision docs not render an organization, employee, or group of
employees a labor union under the National Labor Relations Act or any other law regulating
labor unions. This would avoid requiring compliance with various reporting and registration
requirements that might discourage representation.
52. Monika Schlachter & Achim Seifert, Employee Voice Outside Collective Bargaining, in
COMPARATIVE LABOR LAW 330 (Matthew W. Finkin & Guy Mundlak eds., 2015).
53. Id. at 336-37. Some have proposed similar works councils in the United States. See,
e.g., Stephen F. Befort, A New Voice for the Workplace: A Proposal for an American Works
Councils Act, 69 MO. L. REV. 607, 607-10 (2004).
54. Schlachter & Seifert, supra note 52, al 336.
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representative body in arbitration negotiations could be distinct from
any union in the workplace if the employees so desired. 55
Other countries also have statutes that provide for employee
representation regarding particular issues. For example, many
countries have health and safety representatives elected by the
employees. 56 Others have representatives for particular groups with
unique issues such as young workers and/or apprentices or workers
with disabilities. 57 These systems provide models that can be followed
for arbitration representation.
A negotiation mandate would provide employees with a voice
regarding the terms of arbitration. Currently only high level
employees who negotiate individual arbitration agreements have any
say in the terms of arbitration agreements. Other employees are
forced to accept the terms established unilaterally by the employer,
often with little or no knowledge regarding the agreement or its
implications.
At the very least, implementation of a negotiation requirement
would make employees aware before a dispute arises that their rights
to litigate have been eliminated. Even better, employees might be
able to negotiate away some of the most egregious terms of employerimposed arbitration mandates. Additionally, imposition of the
negotiation requirement approximates creation of employees as a
repeat player in the system. If employees are dissatisfied with the
arbitration process or results, they can insist on a different arbitration
provider in the next negotiation.
The benefits of providing employees voice in their working
conditions have been well-documented. 58 Increasing employee voice
55. Alternatively, an existing union could negotiate for the unionized employees, and all
other employees could choose their representative.
56. Schlachter & Seifert, supra note 52, at 345-46; see also HUGH COLLINS, EMPLOYMENT
LA w 30 (2d ed. 2010) (describing health and safety committees required in each workplace in
the EU, which identify risks and agree on ways to reduce such risks). Some U.S. states also
require workplace health and safety committees, but the requirements arc not commonly
enforced in the absence of union representation. Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Representation
Outside the Labor Act: Thoughts on Arbitral Representation, Group Arbitration and Workplace
Committees, 5 u. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 75, 90-91 (2002).
57. Schlachter & Seifert, supra note 52, at 346-47.
58. Befort, supra note 53, at 610-13 (summarizing benefits of providing voice to employees
regarding their working conditions). Indeed, even management consultants encourage
employers to provide opportunities for employee voice. See, e.g., Christine Comaford, How to
Propel Employee Engagement to Sky-Rocketing Levels, FORBES (July 14, 2018), <https://
www.forbcs.com/sitcs/christinecomaford/2018/07/14/want-to-better-engagc-your-tribe-hercsthe-secrct/#54dabclc9dc4> (promoting the value of engaging employees to minimize destructive
behavior and foster high productivity and collaboration); Sneh Kadakia, The Business Value of
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can improve morale, creativity, and productivity, lengthen employee
job tenure, and encourage and train employees for participation in
the larger community. 59 These benefits will inure to both the
employer and the community. To achieve them, the negotiation
requirement should be structured to facilitate employee voice.
All employees working for the employer who might be subject to
arbitration should be in the negotiation unit, including the high-level
executives with whom some employers already negotiate arbitration
agreements. 60 A unit composed of all employees will increase their
power, making it far more likely that the terms of the negotiated
agreement will be fair to employees. While executives might prefer to
negotiate their own agreements, it seems only fair that their
employees receive the same agreement that executives have.
One concern may be more that the more powerful employees
will dominate negotiations, limiting the voice of rank and file
employees.61 This valid concern is minimized because negotiations are
limited to arbitration agreements. In addition, the powerful
employees have an incentive to negotiate an agreement that is fair to
employees, since they themselves will be bound to the agreement.
The concern could also be addressed by permitting non-managerial,
non-supervisory employees to vote to negotiate separately, similar to
the vote that professional employees have under the National Labor
Relations Act to opt to form separate bargaining units. 62 Negotiating
separately from managers and supervisors would facilitate employee

Leveraging Your Employees' Collective Voice, MEDIUM: THE ART & SCI. OF PEOPLE SUCCESS
(Apr. 25, 2017), <https://medium.com/glint-od-sciencc/the-business-value-of-lcveraging-youremployees-collective-voice-fc91aa62c6ef>; Pat Lynch, Employee Voice: A Critical Element of
Organizational Success, Bus. ALIGNMENT STRATEGIES, INC., <http://www.businessalignment
strategies.com/research/employee-voice.php> (last visited Sept. 23, 2018).
59. Befort, supra note 53, at 610-13.
60. Colvin & Pike, supra note 6, at 60.
61. The National Labor Relations Act excludes supervisors from the coverage of the
statute, both to protect employees from the subversion of their interests by their supervisors and
to permit employers to maintain loyal supervisors in their disputes with employees. 29 U.S.C. §
152(3) (2012).
62. See id. § 159(b )(1 ). In union representation elections in units composed of both
professional and nonprofessional employees, the professional employees vote whether to be
represented by the union and also whether to be included in the same unit with the
nonprofessional employees. See David M. Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded Managers from
Covered Professionals under the N LRA, 89 CO LUM. L. REV. 1775, 1797-99 (1989) (citing
legislative history of the professional vote). Some public sector jurisdictions allow
nonprofessional employees a similar vote on whether to be included in a unit with professional
employees. See, e.g., 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 315/9 (a)(2)(b) (2016) (requiring a majority vote of
both professional and nonprofessional employees for inclusion in a joint bargaining unit in
Illinois).
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collective action on other issues should the negotiation requirement
for arbitration inspire them to do so.
Requiring negotiation with employee representatives to establish
an arbitration procedure offers other benefits as well. Over time,
negotiations may produce models of fair arbitration procedures that
can be used by other organizations. Of course, the same result could
be achieved by legislatively mandating certain fair procedures. The
advantage of the negotiation approach is that it allows the employer
and workers to adopt the best model for their particular workplace.
Some might prefer elaborate procedures that approximate litigation,
while others might choose quick, cheap, and easy processes. 63 More
workplaces might establish comprehensive dispute resolution
procedures that include such features as mediation. 64 The choice of
system may depend on the type of disputes that are common in the
workplace. These preferences might change with experience of the
parties, and negotiation would allow modification as desired.
Additionally, employee representatives and employers might create
processes that allow consolidation of claims without the extensive
procedures of class actions, saving time and money for both sides,
which arbitration was originally designed to do. 65
Requiring negotiations offers the possibility of a fair, but quicker
and cheaper method of dispute resolution. If, however, employers are
choosing arbitration only because it offers them an advantage, then
the negotiation requirement may reduce or substantially eliminate the
use of arbitration. Thus, critics of the arbitration system may achieve
their desired result without the necessity of legislatively ending
arbitration. Arbitration, when used, will be truly a creature of
agreement between the parties as intended by the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA).
63. Labor arbitration procedures vary widely depending on the needs and desires of the
parties. COOPER ET AL., supra note 45, at 19-29.
64. See, e.g., Dispute Resolution Program, HALLIBURTON, <http://www.halliburton.com/
en-us/employees/drp/disputc-resolution-program-drp.page?node-id=hhdx6tlw>(lastvisitcd Sept.
23, 2018).
65. Lawyers representing employees may bring multiple identical claims in arbitration on
behalf of employees who would otherwise join together in a class action, imposing substantial
costs on employers that preclude class claims. See Scott Flaherty, Plaintiffs Attys Turn Employee
Arbitration Pacts Into Weapons (July 9, 2014), https://www.outtengolden.com/plaintiffs-attysturn-employee-arbitration-pacts-into-weapons (describing use of such a strategy by lawyers
representing employees after earlier decisions limiting class actions); Mark Tabakman, The Epic
Systems Case-Note To Employers-Don't Wish For Something Because You May Get It! (May
30, 2018), h ttps://wageh o urla w.foxrothsch ii d.com/2018/05/ articles/class-actions/th e-e pi c-systemscase-n ote-to-em pl oyers-d on t-wish-for-something-because-you-may-get-it/ (expressing employer
fears of multiple individual arbitration cases after the decision in Epic Systems).
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It might be argued that providing employee voice has anti-union
roots and this proposal might discourage unionization. 66 Given the
low unionization rate in the United States, other mechanisms for
voice may offer a positive alternative, however. 67 Additionally, the
proposal may in fact encourage more collective activity, if not
unionization. As employees gain experience and see benefits from
working together, they may choose to do so with respect to other
issues. And unions may offer representation in negotiations for
arbitration agreements, as well as representation in arbitration,
providing an opportunity to demonstrate the value of union
representation generally. 68 To further explore the benefits and
challenges of this proposal, it is helpful to describe the proposal in
more detail, which will be done in the following section.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEGOTIATION REQUIREMENT

A requirement that employers negotiate any arbitration
requirement with their employees would require the enactment of
legislation. As interpreted by the courts, the FAA requires
agreement, but that agreement can be made a condition of
employment. Congress should amend the FAA to prohibit
conditioning employment on agreement to arbitration unless the
arbitration agreement was negotiated with a representative of the
employees. This will enable employees to have a voice in their
arbitration agreements by selecting a representative with their fellow
employees and setting the terms of the arbitration agreement.
A. Selecting the Representative

The existmg machinery of the NLRB could be used for
implementation, minimizing startup costs, and eliminating the need
for an additional enforcement agency. The NLRB already conducts
elections for union representation, 69 so it could conduct
representation elections for arbitration negotiations as well. 70 The
66. Schlachter & Seifert, supra note 52, at 333 & n.8.
67. Id. at 334.
68. Hodges, supra note 3, at 1692.
69. Conduct Elections, NLRB, <https://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/conduct-clections> (last
visited Sept. 23, 2018). For detailed description of the procedures, see THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW§ 10.111 (John E. Higgins, Jr. ed., 7th ed. 2018).
70. Michael Oswalt has proposed automatic elections for union representation. His
proposal considers some of the same issues that arise with the proposal for elections for
arbitration representation, and his solutions would work well here also. See Michael M. Oswalt,

248

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 22:235

agency could determine the appropriate voting group, as it currently
does for union representation elections. 71 The employer should not be
permitted to manipulate the voting group by limiting the application
of the arbitration provision. 72 The smallest possible group for
application should be a single location of the employer, but there
should be an option to combine multiple locations that have similar
categories of employees. As noted supra, representation options
could include organizations, individuals, or groups of workers, and
employees could vote on their preference as among the groups or
individuals interested. As in other elections conducted by the
NLRB, 73 a majority of valid votes counted should determine the
representative. Where there are multiple representation options on
the ballot, the NLRB has current rules that could be used to
74
determine the winner and whether a run-off is necessary.
In order to facilitate representation, an employer would have to
notify the NLRB of its intent to negotiate an agreement in advance. 75
The NLRB could then post this information on its web site for a short
period of time, perhaps thirty days. Following the posting, the NLRB
would initiate the determination of the appropriate voting group. This
posting would allow any union or other worker representation group
to offer its services to the employees. The employees, however, could
choose an employee group or individual instead. Initially a default
option might be necessary, although the posting of a notice might
obviate the need by prompting interest from worker representatives.
The simplest default option would be a group of workers. 76 The
NLRB could be authorized to determine the appropriate
representational formula, one representative for a certain number of
workers. In organizations with powerful workers included in the
group, it seems likely that at least some will want a voice in the
procedure that will affect their legal rights and thus will choose to
compete for a position as representative.
Automatic Elections, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 801, 842-45 (2014).
71. 29 U.S.C.§159(b) (2012).
72. As indicated supra notes 60-62, and accompanying text, high level employees should
not be excluded from the group as their presence may lead to fairer procedures.
73. Conduct Elections, supra note 69 (indicating that representation elections arc decided
by a majority of votes cast).
74. Oswalt, supra note 70, at 843.
75. The NLRB could determine that appropriate timing of the election. Id. at 842, 845.
76. Oswalt's suggestion that employees submit to the Regional Director of the NLRB
prior to the election names of those willing to serve as a bargaining team would work for this
purpose. Id. at 842-43.
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Employers that have existing arbitration agreements at the time
the legislation passes should be given a reasonable time for a
representation election to be conducted and negotiations to occur to
replace the old agreement. Unlike NLRB elections, the employer
would have little reason to delay the election for arbitration
representation. Indeed it might be unions that benefit by delay, giving
them more time to convince employees to choose a union for
representation, an interesting reversal of the current situation. 77
There are challenges to the proposed system that must be
considered. The inclusion of management employees in the
negotiation unit may threaten the freedom of all employees to choose
their representative without coercion. Under the NLRA, employers
are permitted to campaign in union representation elections so long
as they do not engage in conduct unlawfully interfering with
employee choice. 78 Rules should prohibit anyone who is not subject to
the arbitration agreement from taking any position on the employees'
choice of representative. While employers might have a preference to
negotiate with an employee committee rather than a union, for
example, there seems to be little reason to privilege the employer to
voice this preference. Any violation of the rule should invalidate the
election, requiring a new election. 79 This penalty should discourage
employer interference, as the employer desiring to use arbitration
would be delayed in implementing it.
In union representation elections, conduct interfering with
employee free choice by supervisors and managers is attributable to
the employer and thus prohibited. 00 In arbitration elections, however,
these personnel would be subject to the arbitration policy. Therefore,
they should be permitted to campaign for the representative of their
choice. Their participation, however, raises the risk of coercing the
employees that they supervise and manage. For example, the
employees might prefer a union representative to negotiate while the
managers might prefer an employee committee and try to convince
the employees not to choose the union.
To preserve free choice for all employees, one possibility is to
regulate the campaigning to prohibit conduct that interferes with free

77. Implementation of this proposal might encourage employers to support more funding
and staff for the NLRB, another henefit for workers.
78. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 69, § 9.1.A.
79. See id. § 9.lll (describing similar remedy for elections for union representation).
80. See id. § 6.1.
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choice as the NLRB does in representation elections. Such
regulation brings the potential for long delays in finalizing election
results, however. The delay would prevent implementation of the
arbitration program, which offers the potential for opportunistic
behavior on the part of managers who want to avoid arbitration. On
the other hand, managers may not resist arbitration if the employer
wants to implement it. And as noted above, higher level managers are
likely to negotiate in their own interest as they do in bargaining for
their individual arbitration agreements. 82
Instead, allowing supervisors and managers to campaign, either
without limitation or with restrictions only on egregious conduct is a
better option. While there is potential for coercion of free choice, the
employees will have an opportunity to choose another representative
in three years if they are dissatisfied. This seems preferable to the
extensive regulation that exists for union representation elections,
which causes long delays and often does not lead to a different
election outcome when the tainted election is repeated. 83

B. Negotiating the Agreement
Arbitration agreements should be time limited, requmng the
parties to renegotiate them periodically. Three years offers sufficient
time for the parties to assess the current agreement and determine
whether changes should be made. A new representation election
should be held six months before the three-year expiration to ensure
sufficient time for renegotiation. The employees could choose the
same representative, if satisfied, or change representation.
Some mechanism would be required to resolve disputes between
the employer and employee representative if they could not agree on
arbitration terms. There are several possible options. One would be
to simply prohibit arbitration without an agreement, making litigation
of disputes the default option. This would force the employer to offer
reasonable terms to the employees. This potentially gives the
81. See id. §§ 6.Il, 9.1.
82. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
83. See generally Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to
the Rules of Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REV. 655 (2010) (discussing the impact of
employer actions, lawful and unlawful, in union organizing campaigns and consequent delays);
Paul C. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Orfmnization Under the
NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983) (same); see also Daniel H. Pollitt, NLRB Re-Run
Elections: A Study, 41 N.C. L. REV. 209, 212 (1963) (finding that objecting unions won only 30
percent of re-run elections in 1960-62).
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employees the power to prevent arbitration by insisting on terms the
employer would not conceivably accept. Given the employer's
inherent power over all employees, however, this does not seem to be
a significant risk. Further, some employees might prefer a fair
arbitration system rather than litigation, including those executives
who currently negotiate such agreements.
A second alternative would allow the NLRB to develop model
arbitration agreements that would be the default if the parties could
not reach agreement. 84 The NLRB could develop such models
through rulemaking which offers employers, unions, and employees
the opportunity for input, leading to a model that balances the
interests of the employer and the employees. The parties would know
the possible alternatives to agreement, which might provide an
incentive to negotiate an agreement acceptable to both. 85
Instead of the NLRB template, the law could provide arbitration
as the final step of negotiations if the parties cannot reach
agreement. 86 Interest arbitration, as it is known, is used in many
public-sector collective bargaining negotiations where economic
weapons are disallowed. 87 The arbitration contemplated here would
be relatively simple compared to arbitration of an entire collective
bargaining agreement. 88 An employer seeking to impose arbitration
on its employees should not complain if an arbitrator is used to
determine what should be included in the agreement. While interest
arbitration does differ from grievance arbitration in its impact, the
employer would only be bound to use the imposed system for three
years. And who should know better than an arbitrator what works in
arbitration and what does not? If a safety valve is deemed desirable,
the employer could be empowered to reject the imposed arbitration
system and return to the litigation default.
84. A variation on the requirement could allow an employer to avoid negotiations if it
adopted one of the NLRB template arbitration agreements. This variant would lose some of the
benefits of encouraging employee voice, however. Nevertheless, it might still lead unions or
other workers' organizations to engage in representation in arbitration through the notice and
representation procedure.
85. In interest arbitration in the public sector some states structure the arbitration to
encourage the parties to reach agreement. MARTIN H. MAUN ET AL., PUBLIC SECTOR
EMPLOYMENT 840-41 (3d ed. 2016). For example, when the arbitrator must choose the final
offer of one of the parties, as opposed to a compromise between them, it encourages the parties
to make their final offers reasonable which may, in fact, lead to agreement rather than
arbitration. Id.
86. Id. at 803.
87. Id. at 799.
88. See id. at 803-04, 814-42 (illustrating the length and complexity of interest arbitration
proceedings in the public sector).
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A third alternative, although the least desirable, is to allow the
parties to use economic weapons such as the strike and lockout to
resolve the dispute, like those allowed by the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA). If the parties are unable to reach agreement
each side would be free to use economic pressure in support of its
proposals. Nonsupervisory, nonmanagerial employees would be
protected from retaliation for such conduct by the NLRA so long as
they act together, 89 but the law would need to protect employees not
covered by the NLRA. Under this rule, as in labor negotiations, the
employer could unilaterally implement its proposed arbitration
agreement if good faith negotiations reached impasse. 90
This alternative may provide too much power to the employer,
but several factors mitigate this concern. To the extent that highly
skilled employees are included in the group, the employer must be
wary of discouraging such employees from accepting or retaining
employment. Reputational disadvantage may thus restrain the
91
employer from adopting a decidedly unfair agreement. In some
cases, however, there may be no powerful employees in the group
subject to arbitration. For example, a single location retailer, such as a
discount store or a coffee shop may have no truly high-level, highly
paid employees. 92 In that case, an employer that imposed an unfair
agreement would only be able to do so for three years before
subsequent negotiations would occur. Employees subject to the
agreement would be incentivized to choose a more powerful
representative and use their own forms of economic pressure for the
following agreement. Of course, in some cases the employees would
be unable to exert much effective pressure, but it is hard to see how
this is worse than the current system, which allows the employer to
89. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (protecting the right to engage in concerted activities for mutual
aid or protection).
90. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 69, § 13.II.A; see also Terrence H.
Murphy, Impasse and the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 24-26 (1977)
(describing circumstances in which unilateral employer action may be the most productive way
lo break an impasse); Peter Guyon Earle, Note, The Impasse Doctrine, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
407, 407-08 (1988) (outlining the history and scope of the impasse doctrine).
91. See Kathryn Rubino, Which Big/aw Firms Still Require Summer Associates To Sign
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements?, ABOVE THE LAW (June 12, 2018), <https://abovcthclaw.
com/2018/06/which-biglaw-firms-still-rcquirc-summcr-associatcs-to-sign-mandatory-arbitrationagrccments/> (reporting on law firms that revoked arbitration requirements for summer
associate after publicity and resulting backlash).
92. See, e.g., Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1249-57 (11th Cir. 2008)
(describing duties of store managers and assistant managers who spent 80-90 percent of their
time on non-managerial duties, including janitorial duties, with average pay of less than $ 10 per
hour).
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impose arbitration with any terms it desires as a condition of
employment. Ultimately, as is currently the case, the courts could
refuse to enforce an agreement that is unconscionable or does not
otherwise meet the requirements of the F AA. 93 In light of these
concerns, however, as well as the fact that this alternative may lead to
disruptive strikes and lockouts, the first two options are preferable.
Another concern about the proposal may be the limits it poses
on individual negotiation of arbitration agreements by employees.
The exclusive representation requirement, which prevents individuals
from negotiating their own agreement where a representative has
been chosen by a majority of workers, has been upheld as
constitutional under the NLRA. 94 The Supreme Court imposed on
labor unions a duty to fairly represent all workers as a corollary to the
exclusive representation requirement to avoid a constitutional
question. 95 The circumstances of the case that led the Court to impose
the duty involved egregious race discrimination in negotiations% at a
time prior to the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which
prohibits race discrimination by employers and unions. 97
The risk of discrimination or bad faith conduct by the
representative is much reduced when the same arbitration agreement
must be negotiated for all employees. It is possible, however, that an
agreement could cover some claims while allowing others to be
litigated. In making such a determination, race, gender, or other bias
could infect the negotiations. One way to deal with the problem is to
impose the duty of fair representation. Such a duty might discourage
employees from serving as representatives, however, unless some sort
of insurance protected them from the costs of litigation and liability.
The ability to have discriminatory arbitration agreements set aside by
a court in the same way that any other unconscionable agreement
would be under the FAA provides another solution. 98 This removes
the discouraging effect of imposing liability on representatives, while
93. See, e.g., Chavarria v. Ralph's Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 927 (9th Cir. 2013) (refusing
to enforce unconscionable arbitration agreement); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933,
938-40 (4th Cir. 1999) (ref using to enforce arbitration agreement with "egregiously unfair"
arbitration rules).
94. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S.1, 43-45 (1937); see also J.l. Case Co. v.
NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337-39 (1944) (holding that individual contracts must yield lo the collective
agreement and did not bar enforcement of the duty to bargain collectively).
95. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S.192, 198, 202-04 (1944).
96. Id. at 194-96.
97. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c-2(a), (c) (2012).
98. See, e.g., Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2013).
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still allowing challenges to unfair or discriminatory agreements. And
as noted, supra, unless the representative body or individual is
actually a labor union that represents workers in collective
bargaining, it should not be deemed a union for purposes of other
99
regulation of labor unions like the duty of fair representation.
V. FEASIBILITY OF THE BARGAINING REQUIREMENT
Opponents of mandatory arbitration in employment have thus
far failed to convince Congress to outlaw it. It is certainly possible
that legislation allowing arbitration only if the process is negotiated
with a representative of the employees will suffer the same fate. If
arbitration is truly a valuable alternative to litigation, however, then
this proposal would allow it to serve that role without enabling
employers to use it as a weapon to preclude employee legal claims
unfairly or diminish their chances of winning their cases as compared
to court. An alternative to amending the FAA would be to amend
specific statutes such as the FLSA or Title VII to preclude arbitration
of legal claims without an agreement negotiated with employee
representatives. Legislation limiting arbitration of particular claims
100
may be more likely to pass.
The proposal also has the value of increasing employee voice in
the workplace. Employee participation in the workplace increases the
101
likelihood of their involvement as citizens in the community. This
99. See supra note 51. Although many unions hold membership votes to ratify collective
bargaining agreements once negotiated, contract ratification is not required by law, THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 69, § 25.III.C, and should not be mandated for
arbitration agreements either.
100. For example, currently the Mc-Too movement is leading to pressure to bar arbitration
of sexual harassment claims, which has been successful in New York. SUMMARY OF NEW YORK
SENATE LEGISLATIVE ACTION 5, available at <https://www.scribd.com/document/383666
745/2018-NYScnate-Session-Highlights#from_embed> (last visited Sept. 23, 2018) (describing
budget bill that prohibits mandatory arbitration of sexual harassment complaints); Susan Gross
Shlinsky ct al., New York Enacts Sweeping Sexual Harassment Laws, EPSTEIN BECKER GREEN
(Apr. 20, 2018) <https://www.cbglaw.com/news/new-york-statc-cnacts-swecping-sexual-harass
ment-lawsl> (describing the New York legislation which applies to employers with four or more
employees and to agreements entered into after the effective date of the legislation); see also
Nick Wingfield & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Microsoft Moves to End Secrecy in Sexual
Harassment Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2017), <https://www.nytimcs.com/2017/12/19/techno
logy/microsoft-sexual-harassment-arbitration.htmb (reporting that Microsoft ended mandatory
arbitration for sexual harassment claims for its employees and was supporting federal legislation
to do the same in the wake of the publicity regarding sexual harassment claims against powerful
men).
101. See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: How WORKPLACE BONDS
STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 134-39 (2003); CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTIClPATION
AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 83-84, 102, 105-06 (1970); James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group
Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1563, 1596 (1996); Lisa Schur ct al., High
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has traditionally been viewed as a benefit of the workplace
democracy created by the NLRA. 102 With the decline of unions,
providing for employee involvement in other ways will enhance
citizenship in the community, an essential ingredient of a democratic
•
103
society.
In addition to encouraging community involvement, the proposal
may encourage more active employee involvement in workplace
govemance. 104 One might envision employee groups collectively
addressing issues such as harassment or discrimination. 105 The
employees might designate a representative to accompany
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
106
inspectors. Indeed the employees may even develop more efficient
and effective methods of operation, increasing the employer's bottom
line.
The proposal might have the added consequence of increasing
unionization by providing an opportunity for unions to demonstrate
their value to employees. Further, the requirement may discourage
employers from using the administrative process to defeat employee
desire for voice in the workplace. The possibility of this result, in

Involvement Work Systems and Political Efficacy: A Tale of Two Departments, in INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION SERIES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 56TH ANNUAL MEETING
9, 9-10 (Adrienne E. Eaton ed., 2004); Paula B. Yoos, Democracy and Industrial Relations, in
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION SERIES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 56TH
ANNUAL MEETING, supra al 1, 3, Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to
Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1822-23 (1983).
102. Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and
Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1423-27 (1993); Craig Becker, Democracy in
the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495,
502-03 (1993). Some supporters of the NLRA thought that providing workers with a voice in the
workplace would reduce the chances of worker rebellion against the existing social order. James
J. Brudncy, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining Protections and the Statutory Aging
Process, 74 N.C.L. REV. 939, 950 (1996). Senator Wagner, the primary sponsor of the NLRA,
relied on the vision of Louis Brandeis, who asserted the importance of workers' participation in
the conduct of business as a "daily experience of 'responsibility' . . . necessary to their
'intellectual, moral and spiritual development .... "' Barenberg, supra, at 1426 (quoting
PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 192 (1984)).
103. While employers might not sec encouraging citizen involvement as an important goal,
maintenance of our democratic society should motivate society at large and our legislators. For
employers, the value of voice is increasing productivity and creativity of employees.
104. See generally CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELFREGULATION TO CO-REGULATION (2010) (discussing the potential for co-regulation).
105. See COLLINS, supra note 56, al 75-76 (encouraging "participatory self-regulation" in
general and in particular in the area of discrimination because it enhances inclusion and the
likelihood of effective practices); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination:
A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 530-35 (2001) (describing the potential for
employee groups to address entrenched patterns of discrimination in workplaces).
106. See 29 C.F.R. § 1903.8 (2018).
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addition to the restriction that it imposes on employers, may doom
the legislation in a Congress dominated by corporate interests. In
truth, however, the proposal does nothing more than insure that the
FAA is accomplishing its goal of enforcing voluntarily negotiated
arbitration agreements. The negotiation requirement adds structure
to what proponents of arbitration say is already happening,
agreement to arbitration, providing an added safeguard to insure that
is the case.
As for opponents of arbitration, they may also oppose this
proposal because it allows arbitration to continue. Labor unions are a
natural constituency, but their support will increase employer
opposition. In the end, politics may make the proposal a difficult sell.
If arbitration has value, however, as a cheaper, quicker method
of dispute resolution, then trying a negotiated version may be
worthwhile. If it does not, a negotiation requirement may hasten its
elimination. While this solution to forced arbitration is unlikely to
work for consumers, who do not have the ability to choose
107
representation and negotiate in a similar manner, it does offer an
option for preserving arbitration in the workplace while insuring a
fairer system for workers.
V. CONCLUSION
Arbitration in employment law appears here to stay for awhile,
at least absent some dramatic shift in the political landscape.
Requiring employers to negotiate the terms of arbitration agreements
with representatives chosen by their employees offers an opportunity
for employees to have some voice in the arbitration procedure that
governs their work life and determines their legal rights.
Employers assert that both arbitration and employee voice have
value. If that is the case, they should not oppose this proposal.
Congress has an opportunity to create a system that actually offers
the opportunity for a cheaper, quicker, and fair alternative to
litigation as contemplated by the FAA. The alternatives, continuing
the current unfair system, precluding arbitration altogether, or
mandating fair procedures provide some benefits to some participants
107. Those interested in eliminating or ensuring fair arbitration for consumers will have to
rely on legislation or other mechanisms. See generally Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and
Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act and the Supreme Court's Recent Arbitration
Jurisprudence, 48 Haus. L. REv. 457 (2011); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Uniform Arbitration: One
Size Fits All Does Not Fit, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RES0L. 759 (2001).
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in the system but a negotiation option allows continued use of
arbitration while increasing the likelihood that it fairly resolves
employment law disputes. More employer support for the NLRB may
be an added benefit. Further, negotiation encourages employee
participation in both the workplace and the community. Given these
benefits, it is a system worth testing.

